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1. Introduction 
In recent years, a remarkable discussion has taken place on the question of how labour market 
institutions and unemployment are associated. Generally speaking, a consensus that labour 
market institutions have an effect on unemployment exists. However, with respect to the sign 
of the effect it seems that specific variables do not match this view.
1 Furthermore, these vari-
ables differ across countries. This paper will shed more light on that point. The mainstream 
macro-econometric approach in this field of research is to apply panel data models, because of 
data availability, consideration of unobserved heterogeneity and/or multicollinearity. How-
ever, the application of this method in this context has been criticised lately. “Cross-country 
studies that relate unemployment rates to labour market institutions have limitations in the 
sense that institutions do not change frequently, and cross-sectional variation only is insuffi-
cient to catch the true effect of institutions.”
2  
However, it should be mentioned that cross-country studies do come to important conclu-
sions. Blanchard and Wolfers (2000) find out that the duration of macroeconomic shocks in-
creases with labour market institutions. Belot and van Ours (2000) find significant interac-
tions between institutional variables. Nickell et al. (2002) have shown that it is helpful to use 
the Beveridge-Curve to analyse the effects of institutional variables on unemployment. Fi-
nally, Nickell et al. (2005) come to the conclusion that interactions between institutions and 
shocks make no significant contribution to the different experiences with unemployment. 
In this paper the effects of institutional variables on unemployment are reinvestigated for nine 
OECD countries. In contrast to existing papers the used framework allow for country specific 
specifications and endogenous institutional variables. The possible endogeneity of the institu-
tional variables will be controlled by using an Instrumental Variable estimator. The impact of 
the considered institutional variables on unemployment may differ across countries, not only 
in absolute terms, but also in terms of sign. Due to the fact that the institutional variables vary 
fractionally over time, they are plagued with multicollinearity. For this purpose an estimation 
strategy is developed to cope with this problem. The used framework allows each of the dif-
ferent variables to have two effects; a direct effect on unemployment, and an indirect effect 
via vacant jobs. Among other things the results allow for analysis, if the relationship between 
labour market institutions and unemployment is non-linear. In addition to the institutional 
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 For a detailed discussion with respect to the results of the latest research see, for example, the Journal for Institutional Comparisons (Vol. 
1(2), summer 2003). 
2
 Belot and Van Ours (2003), p. 3.    2
variables, thought has been given to several macroeconomic variables to get more reliable 
estimates.  
The main results are the following: First, there are remarkable differences across countries 
with respect to the estimated effects. Most of the considered variables have at least in one of 
the considered countries an unexpected effect. Secondly, after a careful examination of the 
results we identify complex interdependencies between the institutional variables which bear 
resemblance to the interaction hypothesis (e.g. Nickell and Layard (1999)). Thirdly, the esti-
mates with respect to the minimum wage do confirm the theory of monopsonistic labour mar-
kets (Manning (2003). Fourthly, based on a cross country comparison some evidence is found 
that some of the considered labour market institutions have a hump-shaped or U-shaped rela-
tion to the unemployment rate. With respect to the U-shaped relations this means that a reduc-
tion of the benefit replacement rate to zero or the abolition of trade unions would not lead to 
full employment.All things considered, the assumption of individual labour markets is no-
ticeably confirmed, which accentuate the need for country specific estimates. For Germany 
for example, the estimated effect of the replacement rate on unemployment is positive, but for 
benefit duration on unemployment negative. That is, a reduction in both is counterproductive. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the model as well as the data and sec-
tion 3 the estimation strategy. Section 4 reports the estimation results and discusses their im-
plications. Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Methodology and Data 
2.1 The Model 
The model is based on the Beveridge-Curve. From an empirical point of view, the coexistence 
of unemployment and vacancies is undisputed. It has been observed that unemployment de-










































Figure 1: Labour market and Beveridge-Curve   3
In the labour market part of the picture, labour supply (
S E ), for simplicity, is wage inelastic 
and labour demand (
D E ) is downward sloping. This simple and well known model does not 
allow the phenomenon of mismatch, since only unemployment (for 
∗ >W W ) or vacancies 
(for 
∗ <W W ) exist on the labour market. To admit both, a third curve is required which is 
called here effective employment (E ). For each 
∗ W  it follows, that the distance between the 
equilibrium point and the effective employment curve equals the equilibrium rate of unem-
ployment and vacancies of the Beveridge-Curve
3. If the Beveridge-Curve does not lie on the 
axes of v or u , it is clear that E  exists for any given equilibrium on the labour market with a 
certain level of unemployment. If the matching efficiency decreases due to a change in the 
flexibility of labour market institutions, the effective employment curve shifts to the left, like 
in figure 1, and the Beveridge-Curve moves to the right.  
The fundamental idea is that labour market institutions affect both unemployment and vacan-
cies. In the first case, they influence directly the matching efficiency. In the latter case we 
have two indirect effects. First; if firms change their hiring policies with respect to the number 
of vacant jobs, the matching efficiency does not change since this causes a movement along 
the Beveridge-Curve. Secondly; if, on the other hand, it takes a longer (shorter) period to fill a 
vacant job, this in turn affects the matching efficiency. In this case the new point of intersec-
tion of unemployment and vacancies lies on a new curve.  
The approach is to catch the direct and indirect effect separately. The institutional variables 
(X) affect both, unemployment (u) and vacancy (v) rates, whereas the latter has also an effect 
on unemployment: 
α β ++ u= v X γ           (2.1) 
δ + v= X λ            (2.2) 
The lower case letters u and v indicate logs of unemployment and vacancy rates. In general, 
with respect to the considered variables an increasing effect of institutional variables on un-
employment (positive gamma coefficients) is expected, as well as a decreasing effect of insti-
tutional variables on vacancies (negative lambda coefficients). The theory behind the effects 
of the respective institutional variables on unemployment and vacancies will be discussed in 
the next section.  
 
                                                 
3
 Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958) called this relationship Beveridge-Curve, since the idea goes back to Beveridge (1944). For a detailed 
discussion see, for example, Blanchard and Diamond (1989), Bleakley and Fuhrer (1997), Fuentes (2002), and Pissarides (2000).   4
2.2 Considered Variables 
The right-hand side institutional variables are benefit duration (BD), benefit replacement ratio 
(RR), housing (HO), net union density (UD), tax wedge (TW), and the ratio of minimum to 
median wage (WR). In respect of the direct effect on unemployment the following considera-
tions are discussed in the literature.
4 
The expected signs of the variables for the shift of the Beveridge-Curve are not clear-cut. A 
higher BD may shift the Beveridge-Curve to the right, because the wage earners choose a 
longer search period. But this might induce the opposite effect just as well. An extended 
search period may lead to a decreasing quit rate due to a better matching efficiency. The latter 
will lead to a shift of the Beveridge-Curve to the left.  
A higher RR may shift the Beveridge-Curve to the right, because the wage earners with the 
lower wages choose a higher reservation wage. However, combined with a shorter BD this 
may result in a reduced search period (as is the case in the Nordic countries). The latter effect 
shifts the Beveridge-Curve to the left. If HO increases, the mobility of the wage earners will 
decrease and the matching efficiency will decrease too. UD may have two opposite effects on 
the Beveridge-Curve. First, a higher UD can raise wages via the bargaining process and make 
firms chary with respect to hiring. Secondly, a higher UD can stabilise employment at the 
firm level due to a reduction in fluctuations of wages. The first effect shifts the Beveridge-
Curve to the right and the latter to the left.  
If the TW increases, the real consumption wage will decrease and the Beveridge-Curve will 
shift to the right. Wage earners try to negotiate higher wages and because of the relative rise 
of the reservation wage, part of the wage earners with the lower wages choose voluntary un-
employment. If the WR rises due to a higher minimum wage, the wage earners with the lower 
wages will drop out of voluntary unemployment due to the fact that the relative replacement 
rate decreases. On the other hand, this may lead to layoffs in the labour market segment of the 
wage earners with the lower wages. A third explanation based on the theory of a monopsonis-
tic labour market. In this framework it is argued, that an increasing minimum wage could lead 
to increasing employment and decreasing unemployment respectively. At a certain minimum 
wage level the effects reverse. A fourth explanation based on the matching model with search 
effort. If the minimum wage is comparatively low, unemployment decreases with an increas-
ing minimum wage. Again, the over-all effect on the Beveridge-Curve is not clear-cut.  
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 For a more detailed discussion of the interaction between institutional variables and unemployment see, for example, Nickell et al. (2002) 
and Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).   5
In terms of indirect effects of institutional variables on unemployment via vacant jobs the 
following aspects shall be accentuated. It is a matter of common knowledge that job creation 
is higher in the USA than in Europe, and it is also well-known that labour market institutions 
are more distinct in Europe than in the USA. Thus, more flexible labour market institutions 
may lead to a rise in job creation and vacancies in Europe. Reductions in BD, RR, and HO 
could act as signals for firms in two ways. First, the labour force takes more fright at layoffs. 
Secondly, the applicants for a vacant job are more committed. The first effect may lead via a 
higher productivity to a rise in job creation and the latter effect may increase job creation too. 
The reason is that firms interpret these effects as an increased competitiveness of domestic 
labour force.  
A decline in UD and TW is leading to a reduction of labour costs. If trade unions lose bar-
gaining power, firms expect moderate wage increases and lower firing costs. Since TW incor-
porates none-wage labour costs, they decline if TW declines. At last, a rise in WR, on the ba-
sis of an increasing minimum wage, results in a decreasing job creation in the low wage seg-
ment of the labour market. Again, firms interpret these effects as decreased competitiveness 
of domestic labour force, which may increase the export of jobs. However, in the monopsony 
model and some matching models (with endogenous participation rate or search effort) the 
vacancies rate could increase with the minimum wage. All theses specified effects can be re-
inforced or alleviated by a change in the matching efficiency which has a direct effect on the 
vacancy rate via the duration of staffing. 
To get more reliable estimates, thought has been given to several macroeconomic variables. 
These variables are labour costs (LC), trend labour productivity (LP), deviations from the 
trend of the total factor productivity (TFP), real interest rate (RIR), terms of trade shocks 
(TTS), and labour force participation (LFP). The expected direct effects of the macro vari-
ables on unemployment are the following.  
If LC increase, the Beveridge-Curve shifts to the right. A rise in LP may have two effects. 
First, if LP grows faster than GDP, unemployment increases and the Beveridge-Curve shifts 
to the right. Secondly, if the increase in LP is relatively higher than the increase of the produc-
tivity of other factor inputs, the demand for labour will increase and the Beveridge-Curve will 
shift to the left.  
The effect of TFP on the Beveridge-Curve is expected to be equivalent to the first and second 
supposition for LP. While LP is a trend variable, TFP is a deviation from the trend. This vari-
able is added to control for the possibility that firms pay more attention to deviations of a   6
trend than of the trend itself. A higher RIR will shift the Beveridge-Curve to the right because 
of negative effects on economic growth. TTS may induce different effects on the Beveridge-
Curve. First; a rise in import prices may shift the Beveridge-Curve to the left, due to a substi-
tution of imported goods. Secondly, higher import prices may lead to higher wages via the 
bargaining process and result in a shift of the Beveridge-Curve to the right. And lastly, an 
increase in the LFP shifts the Beveridge-Curve to the right. 
With respect to the indirect effect on unemployment the following aspects are of relevance. If 
the LC rise, firms may decide to reduce vacancies. The effects of LP and TFP are ambiguous. 
On the one hand, firms will increase the vacancies if LP or TFP increases. On the other hand, 
if economic growth is too meagre, this may lead to a decreasing vacancy rate. A rise in RIR 
leads to a decrease in vacancies.  
Again, TTS may induce different effects. First, a rise in import prices may lead to a rise in the 
vacancy rate due to a substitution of imported goods. Secondly, higher import prices may lead 
via higher wages to a decreasing vacancy rate.
5 LFP is unaccounted for in this equation. For 
the indirect effects of macroeconomic variables applies analogously that all effects can be 
reinforced or alleviated by a change in the matching efficiency. 
The variables are taken from the labour market institutions database 2.0 (Nickel and Nunziata 
(2002)). Exceptions are WR and LFP, which are taken from the online OECD labour force 
statistics. See appendix A on how these variables are generated. The maximum rage is from 
1960 to 1995. For later dates not all variables are available. The considered countries are Aus-
tria, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Netherlands, Sweden, UK, and the USA.  
 
3. Estimation Strategy 
In contrast to existing papers on this theme the data for the considered countries should be 
estimated in separate equations, in place of a panel model. The country specific interactions 
between the institutional variables and unemployment and vacancies, respectively, are of 
prominent interest. Of course, country specific effects are possible with panel estimation 
likewise. But what are the advantages of panel estimates when there are no cross country ef-
fects, except possible time effects and a few more degrees of freedom? Furthermore, the 
country specific estimates eliminate the advantage of fixed effects, and random effects do not 
seem to be appropriate in this case.  
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 A third effect is an increase in the oil price. In this case the vacancy rate is expected to decrease, too.    7
A second point concerns the possible endogeneity of institutional variables. If the actual un-
employment is high, it is possible that a certain institutional variable will be adjusted to the 
altered circumstances. In the sixties and seventies the reverse was also true. This applies to the 
effect of a change in the macro variables as well.
6 Panel Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation 
allow merely the same set of instruments for each country. In this case it is not possible to 
account for country specific weak and/or endogenous instruments.  
A third point is multicollinearity. Of course, panel estimation reduces this problem. On the 
other hand, again, it is a country specific issue, if we take country specific estimates into ac-
count. Some of the variables could suffer from multicollinearity in one country but not in the 
others. This affects the specification of the model and the considered instruments.  
To account for all the points an approach has to be developed, that allows for  
•  country specific coefficients,  
•  IV estimates with country specific valid instruments,  
•  reliable estimates in the presents of substantial multicollinearity. 
To account for economic effects, the macroeconomic variables (Z) described above are incor-
porated in the equations as well. In consideration of the residuals (ε) the equations have the 
following form: 
α β ++++ 1 u= v X γ Ζφ ε          (3.1) 
δ +++ 2 v= X λ Zθε           (3.2) 
In the rough, the two equations could be estimated simultaneously. Unfortunately, due to the 
substantial problem with multicollinearity this is not possible.
7 Both equations will be esti-
mated for each country by Two Stage Least Squares with lagged explanatory variables as in-
struments. To account for the possible endogeneity of the variables and the substantial prob-
lem of multicollinearity the following estimation strategy has been chosen.  
Starting from the correlation matrix of the X and Z variables, a combination of variables are 
chosen that have a correlation coefficient lower than 0.8. This procedure allows for estimate 
the same variable in different constitutions of variables, that is, in different subsets.
8 On aver-
age, this compensates the omitted variable bias that results theoretically from incomplete 
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 It is also possible that institutional variables affect macroeconomic variables. See on this point, for example, Nunziata (2004). 
7
 The main reason for the extensive multicollinearity is that the institutional variables do not change much over time.  
8
 Let’s assume we have the exogenous variables a, b, c, d, and e. In addition we assume, a and b as well as d and e suffer from high multicol-
linearity. Instead to estimate the variables in a joint equation, four equations with different subsets will be estimated: acd, ace, bcd, and 
bce.    8
specification. Needless to say, this bias does not exist, if we use valid instruments. That is the 
instruments are exogenous and relevant. It should be noticed that disregarded multicollinear-
ity lead to increased standard errors and unbiased estimators on average. However, the spe-
cific parameters could change their sign, if worse comes to worst. In this case, the general 
effect of a specific variable is unreliable. The described strategy ensures that the sign of the 
respective variables is identified correctly.
9 It is possible that the sign of the estimated parame-
ters differs in comparison to the simple correlation coefficients. This is a potential reason why 
some of the conclusions differ from those of Nickell (2003), who focus on the bivariate corre-
lation.  
In the next step the instruments of each assortment are chosen in a manner that each set of 
instruments is uncorrelated with the error term of the second stage. In the second stage all 
insignificant variables will be taken out. In the last step the finally chosen specification will 
be accepted or rejected (if the remaining instruments are endogenous). This estimation strat-
egy allows country specific unbiased estimates exempt from multicollinearity.  
The main concern should be the sign of the respective variables, that is, the country specific 
differences of the fundamental impact of institutional variables. There are various reasons 
why we should take the size of the coefficients with a pinch of salt. Firstly; up to now we 
know too little about the meaning of lagged effects, in case of institutional variables change 
(noticeable).
10 Secondly; there are further institutional events that are not taken into account, 
either due to data availability or due to low variability.
11 Thirdly; the cultural diversity across 
countries is not taken into account, but it seems to be plausible that it interacts with the insti-
tutions.
12 Fourthly, plain-spoken, we know at best a little bit about the functional form that 
captures the causality thorough. Fifthly, due to the fact that some of the institutional variables 
are highly correlated, we can not definitely distinguish between causality and correlation be-
tween unemployment and institutions. 
 
4. Results 
In principle, the results confirm the guess of fundamental differences between the countries in 
terms of the respective institutional variable. To make the discussion of the results clearly 
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 If, for example, the sign of one parameter differs from his remainder realisations, the equation concerned will be re-specified. In this case 
the change of the sign appears due to high multicollinearity in the first stage of the IV estimation.  
10
 See on this Ljungqvist and Sargant (1998) and (2002). 
11
 See, for example, Belot and Van Ours (2003).  
12
 See Roland (2004) for a discussion of this point.    9
arranged, the average effects of each variable will be displayed in separate tables. Full results 
of the estimates as well as statistics are given in the appendix. Table 1 displays the average 
effect of each variable on the logarithm of the unemployment rate. 
The Beveridge-Curve is confirmed for each country except France.
13 While BD has a negative 
effect on unemployment in Canada and the USA, RR has a negative effect in Germany and 
the UK. In the first case, the increased matching efficiency is the commanding effect. This 
could be an indication of a non-linearity, because BD is tersest in Canada and the USA.
14 That 
is, at a certain point the effect of this variable change the sign. In the second case, it may be 
possible that an increase in RR tends to result in a better match in Germany and the UK. In 
this case, the job seeker is looking for an acceptable contract, not for the first contract that is 
offered, and it will be argued that the latter contract has a shorter duration. The results for RR 
roughly fit into a U-shape, because RR is smallest in Germany and the UK. 
Table 1: Average effects on log(u) 
   Austria Canada  Denmark France  Germany
Nether-
lands Sweden  UK  USA 
LOG(V)  -0.09 -0.17 -0.15 0.25 -1.08 -0.34 -0.77 -0.87 -0.50 
BD  0.53 -5.23 1.79  3.34 10.97 1.80 31.95 1.60 -4.49 
RR  3.12 2.20 8.30 7.26  -17.77  6.74 3.63 -4.04 3.73 
HO  5.00 22.57  48.59  13.30 8.25 12.40  20.82 4.64 15.43 
TW  8.39 -4.95 9.88 11.63 9.34 10.40 -5.50 7.96  2.35 
UD  -4.30 7.10 13.61  -12.89  -11.87  -6.35 6.46 5.15 -1.82 
WR  na -3.79 na 7.01 na  -22.10  na  na -1.36 
LC  0.55 2.46 4.86 1.30 1.12 4.32 -1.49 1.94 0.74 
LFP  0.07 0.05 0.14 0.18 0.12   ◦   -0.12 0.27 0.02 
LP  1.44 1.90 4.70 1.51 1.58 3.76 -1.83 2.12 1.02 
RIR  18.90  6.42  27.35 13.64 21.14 13.53  6.69  8.22  2.72 
TFP  -8.18 -17.69 20.82 -17.46 11.01  ◦ 15.45  17.50  -23.90 
TTS   ◦  27.64 10.39 -16.27  ◦   32.61 13.73 10.75 -22.94 
WR is available only for Canada, France, Netherlands, and the USA. ◦ means no statistical significant effect. 
HO is the only institutional variable with an identical effect in terms of the sign across coun-
tries in principle. The negative effect of TW on unemployment in Canada and Sweden is sur-
prisingly.
15 Theoretical models conclude that more progressive taxes reduce unemployment.
16 
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 This finding is to be concordant with results based on another Beveridge-Curve specification in Ochsen (2004).  
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 BD is very short in Sweden, too, but RR is noticeable higher in Sweden than in Canada and the USA. This is, in turn, an indication of an 
interaction effect between BD and RR. 
15
 With respect to Sweden most of the results are less reliable, since in most of the regressions we have not enough observations. 
16
 See for example Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004).   10
This effect could dominate the negative effects of an increasing tax wedge. Holmlund and 
Kolm (1995) find some evidence in favour of this hypothesis for Sweden.  
The results for UD display a mixed picture. As mentioned above, there are two effects that 
can be positive or negative overall. The more traditional view is ascertained for Canada, 
Denmark, Sweden and the UK. A negative effect of UD on unemployment is found for Aus-
tria, France, Germany, Netherlands and the USA. In this case it will be argued that a lower 
union density increases both fluctuations of wages at the firm level and the quit rate.  
With respect to WR two effects are possible. Firstly; if the minimum wage changes (rises or 
falls) while the median wage remains constant, the expected sign could be positive as well as 
negative, as explained above. Secondly; if the median wage changes (rises or falls) while the 
minimum wage remains constant, the expected sign is negative. The more traditional view of 
a competitive labour market seems to be relevant only for France.
17 However, the monopsony 
model and the above mentioned matching models seam to be relevant for all the considered 
countries.
18  
Due to data availability the estimated effects of LC and LFP on unemployment for Sweden 
based upon the time span 1977 to 1995, which could be the reason for the estimated signs. 
With respect to LFP, particularly in the nineties, unemployment and LFP move in opposite 
directions. This could be an indication that LFP depends on employment opportunities. The 
negative impact of LP on unemployment in Sweden may be explained by a higher productiv-
ity performance of labour compared to other factors of production. That is, capital and inter-
mediates substitute labour only on a small scale. This applies particularly for low skilled la-
bour and is reinforced by the fact that low skilled unemployment is lower in Sweden than in 
all other considered countries.  
A rise in the real interest rate leads to higher unemployment in all considered countries, as 
expected. The estimates for LP are somewhat unexpected, but explainable. LP is a trend vari-
able as explained above. Since productivity increases permanently, it is positive correlated 
with any variable that increases at least for a longer period, as, for example, unemployment. 
Therefore, the deviation of the trend, as used for TFP, would lead to more accurate (and not 
spurious) estimates. The same argument is true for LC, which is constructed in a similar fash-
ion (see appendix A for details). But in this case we received the expected sign. The only ex-
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 Nickell and Layard (1999) argue with respect to France, that the high payroll tax and the not seriously adjusted minimum wage for the 
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 Portugal and Cardoso (2001) received for Portugal results that are coherent with the prediction of the monopsony model.    11
ception with respect to the parameters for LP and LC is Sweden, which has very stable and 
low unemployment rates for three decades. From this it follows that we cannot rely on the 
estimated effects of LP and LC, if we use the level of the variables instead of the deviations 
from the trend, as in the case of TFP.  
A fall in TFP is expected to increase unemployment. For Denmark, Germany, Sweden and the 
UK we obtain the opposite result. In this case the productivity growth is faster than net job 
creation (or GDP). The results support the view that productivity growth is faster in Europe 
than in North America. With respect to TTS it appears that increased import prices reduce 
unemployment due to a substitution of domestic goods for imported goods in France and the 
USA. All the rest of the considered countries experienced a rising unemployment, except for 
Austria and Germany. 
Table 2: Average effects on log(v) 
   Austria Canada  Denmark France  Germany
Nether-
lands Sweden  UK  USA 
BD  -0.51 -3.95 3.52 -3.51  -15.02  -1.77 -5.84 -0.89 6.73 
RR  -1.84 2.74 -7.97 8.66 21.24  -12.60  -0.59 1.65 3.66 
HO  -2.33  26.62 -93.86 15.60 -13.39 -18.84 -5.29  -1.22  9.31 
TW  ◦  -5.56  ◦  -29.93  -12.80  -6.65 -1.41 -2.54 3.85 
UD  2.69  7.43 -11.73 6.61 -12.39 7.14  -7.67 -1.85 -1.17 
WR  na 4.64 na 8.74 na 5.57 na  na 2.47 
LC  -0.53 -2.29 -6.26 1.17 -1.22 -4.27 -1.14 -0.48 1.06 
LP  -0.60 -2.83 -7.44 1.63 -1.46 -3.18 -0.95 -0.52 1.80 
RIR  -12.80 -8.44 -31.74  -16.42  -32.87  -12.59 -9.41  -3.04  -5.24 
TFP  12.55 23.76 27.10 30.17 33.91 22.81 30.39 12.93 20.85 
TTS  ◦   -22.47 -20.34 20.69  34.23  ◦   ◦   ◦   27.26 
WR is available only for Canada, France, Netherlands, and the USA. ◦ means no statistical significant effect. 
Table 2 displays the average effects of institutional and macroeconomic variables on the loga-
rithm of the vacancy rate. With respect to BD and RR the positive effects on vacancies arise 
from a decreasing matching efficiency due to a longer search period and a relative rise of the 
reservation wage. At least one of the variables has a positive effect in Canada, Denmark, 
France, Germany and the UK. For the USA both variables have a positive impact. This can be 
explained by the fact that both BD and RR are comparatively low in the USA. A further re-
duction will have at most a little signalling effect with respect to an increased competitiveness   12
of firms. The effect of a longer search period dominates the signalling effect.
19 Again, BD and 
RR appear to stand in a nonlinear relation to the dependent variable (vacancy rate).  
HO has a positive effect on vacancies in North America and France (due to an extended 
search period), the countries with the highest housing rate. The labour force in these countries 
is more flexible with respect to selling and buying a house, than the labour force in the rest of 
Europe. In the latter the housing rate is lower and an increase leads to a decreased mobility. 
This suggests a U-shape relation to the vacancy rate. 
TW has the expected negative impact, except for the USA. One possible explanation is that an 
increased TW increases the search period. That is, job seekers choose a longer search period 
to find employment with a comparatively higher wage. Or alternatively, they will not accept 
the first offer. Another explanation is the above mentioned progressive taxes argument, which 
applies especially to the low wage segment.
20 With respect to UD two explanations are possi-
ble for the positive effect. Firstly; a higher union density increases the vacancy rate, via re-
duced fluctuations of wages at the firm level. Secondly; the employers search more accurate if 
trade unions get more power, due to increasing firing costs.  
An increased WR appears to increase the search period in all considered countries. The result 
of the competitive labour market theory seems not to be relevant. Two general explanations 
are possible: Firstly; if the median wage changes (rises or falls) while the minimum wage re-
mains constant, the expected sign is positive. Secondly; both the monospony model and the 
above mentioned matching models are in accordance with the estimates.
21  
If we take a look on the effects of the macroeconomic variables on the vacancy rate we find 
much fewer different results. The expected effects with respect to the sign are estimated for 
most of the countries. Exceptions are France and the USA with respect to LC and all other 
countries with respect to LP. The problem with the level of the variables is the same here as in 
the unemployment equation. One explanation for France and the USA is a comparatively high 
growth rate of GDP. That applies for France in particular until the first oil crises and for the 
USA for the whole period to be considered.
22 A second explanation is a substantial structural 
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 Austria has, as well as Sweden, the lowest long run unemployment rate among the European countries. For both countries exclusively 
negative effects of BD and RR on the vacancy rate are estimated. This is surprisingly, to some extent, since these are the economies with 
the strongest long term labour market tightness.  
20
 It seems to be possible that the increased wage (cost) pressure will be dominated, since the increase in the tax wedge is considerable lower 
in the USA than in all the other considered countries.    
21
 In the matching model with endogenous participation rate both the vacancy rate and the unemployment rate increases. This is an explana-
tion for France. In the matching model with search effort, the vacancy rate increases while the unemployment rate decreases, if the 
minimum wage is comparatively low. This model seems to be relevant for all considered countries.  
22
 See for a comparison of GDP growth rates of different OECD countries, for example, Hein and Ochsen (2003).   13
change of the economy. If the manufacturing sector declines and the service sector increases, 
increasing vacancy rates on the one hand, and increasing LC on the other hand, could appear 
simultaneously. The positive effect of TTS, which appears in France, Germany and the USA, 
may result from a substitution of domestic goods for imported goods.  
Nickel and Nunziata (2002) provide also data on collective bargaining coverage, coordination 
index and employment protection index. These variables are not considered for the estimates 
due to theirs low volatility. But we can draw some conclusions by comparing them with the 
results discussed above. Particularly, with regard to collective bargaining coverage and coor-
dination, we can identify interactions with UD. If UD has negative effects on the unemploy-
ment rate, then collective bargaining coverage and coordination seam to have a positive ef-
fect, and vice versa. This interaction effect applies to the vacancy rate too, though, not always. 
That is, focussing on UD alone does not help to understand the relevance of trade unions in 
the discussion of unemployment and/or job creation and job destruction, respectively.  
With respect to BD and RR unexpected signs are found for Canada (BD), Germany (RR), UK 
(RR), and the USA (BD). In any case the values of BD or RR are comparatively low. The 
employment protection index is very low and does not change in the North American coun-
tries and in the UK. The same economies have the lowest collective bargaining power and 
coordination. For Germany, on the other hand, employment protection as well as collective 
bargaining coverage and coordination are comparatively high. Due to the fact that we suppose 
interdependency between collective bargaining coverage and coordination with UD, the latter 
could also be interacted with BD, RR, and employment protection. 
From this it follows the possibility that theses institutions could be linked to each other in 
complex interdependencies which bear resemblance to the interaction hypothesis (e.g. Nickell 
and Layard (1999)). Furthermore, theses institutions could have a hump-shaped (collective 
bargaining coverage, coordination index and employment protection index) and U-shaped 
(BD, RR and UD) effect, respectively, on unemployment. The latter is supported by the esti-
mation results. That is, from two different points higher as well as lower flexibility could 
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Figure 2a: Collective bargaining coverage and 




























Figure 2c: Employment protection index and 




























Figure 2b: Coordination index and unemploy-


























































Figure 2e: Replacement rate and unemploy-




























Figure 2f: Union density and unemployment 
rate (%) 
This bears some similarity with the hump-shaped relation between the degree of centralization 
of bargaining and the unemployment rate (Calmfors and Driffill (1988)); and there are in fact 
similarities, as figure 2 displays. Each point in the six pictures contains an average value over 
five years of one of the considered countries between 1971 and 1995.
23 The quadratic trend 
line confirms the conclusion that the relationship between institutions and unemployment is 
not simply linear. 
It attracts attention that Canada, the USA, and to some extent the UK have comparatively low 
values with respect to collective bargaining, coordination and employment protection. How-
                                                 
23
 An exception is figure 2b. Here the range 1981 to 1995 is chosen, to get a clear figure. Extreme outliers are removed in the graphs. In 
figure 2b the curve for the Netherlands is temporarily at the right of the average curve. In some countries the curve is below the average 
curve in the beginning of the seventies in figure 2c. In Figure 2d the French curve is above and the Swedish curve is below the average 
curve. For the latter the same is temporarily true in figure 2e. In figure 2f the curve of UK is temporarily above the average curve. Data 
for collective bargaining are available only for 31 points.    16
ever, the experiences with unemployment are very different in these countries. Particularly, 
Canada has in the nineties a higher unemployment rate than most of the European countries. 
This can be partly explained with the different combinations of BD, RR and UD.  
The non-linear curves in figure 2 are an average locus across countries and time. Each coun-
tries curve (could) have its own locus with possible country specific shifts. Hence, it does not 
make sense to identify the country specific optimum without knowing the corresponding 
curve. Beyond that, we have to take the effect on the vacancies into account. Therefore, each 
picture is helpful for a better understanding of the mechanisms between institutional variable 
and unemployment, but it does not help to give a reliable policy advice. For the latter is it 
more meaningful to consider the signs of the estimated effects in table 1 and 2.  
 
5. Conclusions 
The results emphasise the different experiences with labour market institutions. They point 
out that panel data models imply strong restrictions, maybe too strong ones in the context of 
the underlying theories. As we have seen, neither of the countries is like another with respect 
to the impact of the individual combined labour market institutions. However, some of the 
considered economies have more in common than others. A more efficient combination of the 
institutions can only be reached if we get a deeper understanding of the country specific inter-
action. It can definitely not be reached, if we simply copy a certain level of a certain labour 
market institution. This can be at best irrelevant and at worst misleading (Rodrik (2004)).  
Regarding the macro variables there are no major differences in the country specific results, 
provided that Sweden is left out. The main difference between the considered countries con-
cerns TFP and TTS. Most of the unexpected results are found for France and the USA. Sur-
prisingly these two countries have the same differences in macroeconomic effects, compared 
to the rest of the considered countries.  
This paper does not give an answer to all the questions in this field of research. As Freeman 
(1998, 2000) notes, if we compare institutions on the international level we find a variety of 
institutional systems and each one has its own rules. The natural next step in research is to 
understand the different systems and to figure out there strengths and weaknesses, though, in 
a more careful manner. The results of the estimates and there implications have at least clari-
fied one important insight: All things considered, the results make strong distinctions clear 
and the different economies should be extremely cautious with respect to a transplantation of 
the level of a certain labour market institution of the neighbours.   17
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Appendix A 
Data description 








αα α =+ − =  
RR1: Unemployment benefit replacement rate received during the first year of unemployment; 
RR2,3: Unemployment benefit replacement rate received during the second and third year of 
unemployment; RR4,5: Unemployment benefit replacement rate received during the fourth and 
fifth year of unemployment. 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002)  
 
RR: Benefit Replacement Rates [0,1] 
RR = percentage of average earnings before tax. 
The data refers to first year of unemployment benefits, averages over family, since many 
countries benefits are distributed according to family composition. 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) → OECD 
 
HO: Housing (percentage owner occupied) [0,1] 
HO = owner occupier households as percentage of total households 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) → Oswald (1996) + unpublished update 
 
TW: Tax Wedge [0,1] 
() N
direct tax indirect tax employment tax
EC DT TX SB
TW
IEE C H C R C C
−
=+ +




EC: Employers’ total contributions; IE: Wage, salaries and social security contributions; DT: 
Amount of indirect tax; HCR: Amount of households’ current receipts; TX: Total indirect 
taxes; SB: Subsidies; CC: Private final expenditures. 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) → London School of Economics CEP-OECD Database 
 
UD: Net Union Density [0,1] 
total reported union members (gross minus retired and unemployed members)
wage and salaried employees
UD =  
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) 
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Wmin: Minimum wage; Wmed: Median wage. 
Source: OECD, Labour Market Statistics - Indicators 
 
 
LC: Labour Costs 
ln ln ln GDP LC IE ET P =− −  
IE: Wage, salaries and social security contributions; ET: Total employment; PGDP: GDP defla-
tor at factor costs. 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) → London School of Economics CEP-OECD Database 
 









E15-64: Employed plus unemployed persons, age cohort 15 – 64; N15-64: Population, age cohort 
15 – 64. 
Source: OECD, Labour Market Statistics - Indicators 
 
LP: Trend Productivity of Labour 
() ln ln LPH G D P E T =−  
H: Hodrick Presscott trend; GDP: Real GDP at 1990 prices; ET: Total Employment.  
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) 
 
RIR: Real Interest Rate 
Long term real interest rate, constructed using long term nominal interest rate and inflation.  
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) → OECD 
 
TFP: Cyclical Component of Total Factor Productivity 
TFP SR H =−  
SR: Solow residual (Nickell and Nunziata (2000)); H: Hodrick Presscott trend. 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) 
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IM: Imports at current prices; GDP: GDP at current prices; PIM: Import price deflator; PGDP: 
GDP price deflator at market prices. 
Source: Nickell and Nunziata (2002) 
 1234567 Average
LOG(V) -0.349 0.103 0.077 -0.140 -0.484 -0.172 0.318 -0.092


















RIRL 12.798 22.394 17.467 13.666 17.577 23.005 25.422 18.904
4.783 6.720 4.769 7.158 3.037 7.006 5.133
TFPHPC -4.677 -10.163 -8.769 -5.192 -9.333 -10.918 -8.175
-2.533 -2.490 -2.499 -2.679 -3.916 -2.909
TTS
adj. R2 0.922 0.823 0.845 0.94 0.777 0.827 0.808
n 2 62 72 73 03 03 02 7
range 1969-1994 1969-1995 1969-1995 1966-1995 1966-1995 1966-1995 1969-1995
J-Stat.  0.088 1.248 0.019 0.244 1.133 1.705 0.115
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) * * * *












All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
LOG(U)














RIR -12.626 -14.741 -11.337 -12.506 -12.802
-2.108 -2.120 -1.784 -2.006
TFP 11.794 11.693 12.477 15.024 12.884 11.455 12.554
1.945 1.824 2.063 1.996 1.965 1.780
TTS
adj. R2 0.572 0.585 0.577 0.193 0.292 0.550
n 2 93 03 03 53 53 0
range 1966-1994 1966-1995 1966-1995  1961-1995  1961-1995 1966-1995
J-Stat.  na na 0.052 2.418 2.241 na









RIR * * * *
T F P ******
TTS
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
LOG(V)
Table A2: Austria123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 Average
LOG(V) -0.045 -0.428 -0.437 -0.552 -0.507 -0.530 -0.323 0.404 -0.187 1.005 -0.553 -0.689 -0.265 -0.025 -0.478 -0.288 0.685 0.170 -0.169
-0.302 -7.504 -3.571 -6.172 -4.627 -5.078 -3.316 1.257 -2.142 2.794 -8.278 -5.594 -4.284 -0.173 -4.919 -3.536 2.332 0.736
BD -6.351 -4.031 -6.109 -4.066 -5.608 -5.233
-7.924 -3.396 -6.082 -3.776 -13.464
BRR 2.047 2.209 3.297 3.195 1.054 2.234 1.442 2.132 2.170 2.198
2.295 2.250 6.707 4.168 2.917 3.618 3.285 2.556 3.688
HO 29.793 17.676 32.502 18.786 14.073 22.566
2.832 2.433 3.766 2.524 2.041
TW -3.028 -8.002 -4.592 -4.201 -5.940 -6.024 -2.838 -4.938 -4.945
-3.434 -7.467 -4.305 -5.926 -5.826 -9.287 -3.180 -5.132
UDNET 6.589 7.608 7.099
6.385 5.806
WR -0.962 -2.677 -6.016 -5.509 -3.791
-1.965 -2.595 -5.632 -4.360
LABC 4.087 1.122 1.989 2.661 2.465
9.253 1.926 3.778 6.824
LFP 0.016 0.058 0.066 0.047
2.340 15.053 5.251
PRODHP 1.313 2.454 1.926 1.897
2.189 3.566 3.755
RIRL 11.331 3.430 2.311 8.945 4.158 11.425 3.784 7.292 5.131 6.423
8.254 2.728 2.139 3.076 6.140 9.986 3.183 2.699 2.425
TFPHPC -18.673 -20.013 -14.377 -17.687
-2.178 -2.726 -3.312
TTS 31.744 34.795 30.191 13.818 27.637
2.326 2.749 3.227 2.391
adj. R2 0.776 0.393 0.645 0.705 0.811 0.723 0.798 0.209 0.939 0.022 0.898 0.797 0.933 0.755 0.829 0.938 0.503 0.792
n 3 32 92 92 93 02 92 92 92 92 92 92 92 93 03 03 33 32 9
range 1963-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1966-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1966-1995 1966-1995 1963-1995 1963-1995 1967-1995
J-Stat.  0.863 5.814* 1.523 2.198 6.054 1.947 0.195 0.128 3.761 1.985 0.029 0.426 0.886 0.906 3.294 0.542 4.608 2.342
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) * * * *************
BD ** * ***
B R R * ** * *** ****
H O * ** * ** ******
TW * * * * **
UDNET * * * * * ***** **
W R ******** ** *
LABC * * * ******** *
LFP * * * **
PRODHP *
RIRL ** ** *
TFPHPC * ***** ********
T T S ** ** ** * *
All instruments are laged by one year
Table A3: Canada
LOG(U)





HO 19.819 29.260 19.350 30.787 33.889 26.621
2.145 2.505 3.150 3.774 2.668
TW -5.032 -5.016 -6.634 -5.561
-4.017 -3.852 -5.076




LABC -1.498 -3.083 -2.290
-2.990 -2.577
PRODHP -1.908 -3.743 -2.825
-3.201 -2.452
RIRL -10.103 -6.783 -8.443
-7.659 -6.353
TFPHPC 25.820 25.442 29.090 15.545 21.451 25.191 23.756
5.185 5.801 7.213 5.033 5.268 5.738 26.556
TTS -28.068 -31.760 -25.585 -33.477 6.537 -22.471
-2.079 -2.479 -2.926 -3.003
adj. R2 0.028 0.074 0.305 0.215 0.238 0.189 0.553 0.296 0.388 0.284
n 2 93 02 92 92 93 02 92 92 93 0
range 1967-1995 1966-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1966-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1967-1995 1966-1995
J-Stat.  4.198 1.124 1.820 0.695 2.094 0.368 1.632 0.133 1.222 1.438
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
B D ** ** * *
B R R * *** ***
H O *********
TW * * *
UDNET * *** *
W R ** *** *
LABC * * * * * * *
LFP
PRODHP
RIRL * * *
TFPHPC * ******
TTS *
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
LOG(V)
Table A4: Canada123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 Average
LOG(V) -0.154 -0.458 -0.201 0.176 -0.312 0.133 -0.480 -0.399 -0.681 0.316 0.840 -0.293 -0.387 -0.146
-1.206 -2.290 -1.414 1.811 -4.314 0.719 -4.502 -4.838 -3.658 1.460 1.947 -3.499 -4.208
BD 1.382 1.992 1.401 2.322 1.863 1.792
4.571 3.243 2.892 2.014 2.239








LABC 4.567 5.157 4.862
5.128 2.128
LFP 0.081 0.182 0.144 0.136
2.009 3.417 2.690
PRODHP 4.314 5.085 4.700
4.361 4.917
RIRL 11.811 18.329 51.900 27.346
2.130 2.040 3.616




adj. R2 0.783 0.521 0.756 0.786 0.797 0.174 0.638 0.749 0.558 0.483 -1.152 0.722 0.658
n 2 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 52 62 52 62 52 5
range 1971-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995 1970-1995 1971-1995 1970-1995 1971-1995 1971-1995
J-Stat.  2.058 3.817 3.556 0.651 1.159 1.687 0.005 1.306 0.121 0.496 0.011 2.063 2.428
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) ******** ****
B D ****** ****
BRR * * * * * * *
HO * * *
T W * *** * *
UDNET * * ** *
LABC ***** **
L F P * * ***** **
PRODHP *
RIRL ** *** *
TFPHPC * * * * * *
TTS * *




BD 2.026 7.595 1.275 2.178 2.445 8.738 2.441 1.499 3.525
4.013 2.870 2.109 2.779 3.917 3.169 2.357 2.236











RIRL -31.512 -31.970 -31.741
-3.025 -3.498
TFPHPC 17.532 36.663 27.098
1.712 2.607
TTS -27.482 -17.249 -16.290 -20.341
-1.683 -1.904 -1.821
adj. R2 0.627 0.193 0.219 0.614 0.55 0.018 0.077 0.502 0.329
n 2 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 62 6
range 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995
J-Stat.  1.601 1.961 1.340 4.226 2.930 0.526 1.243 2.589 2.328
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
B D * **** *
BRR * * * *
H O * * *** *
T W * *** *
UDNET * * * *





T T S ****
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A6: Denmark
LOG(V)123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 Average
LOG(V) 0.579 -0.019 0.227 0.294 0.300 0.034 -0.034 -0.075 0.217 0.147 0.085 0.295 0.695 0.196 0.857 0.253
2.559 -0.111 2.083 4.812 3.748 0.484 -0.136 -2.173 1.336 1.843 0.738 1.257 3.042 1.572 3.331
BD 3.629 3.061 3.345
3.725 5.039
RR 9.985 4.814 2.829 6.363 8.333 11.242 7.261
2.811 2.659 2.904 5.560 2.487 3.933
HO 13.821 12.777 13.299
6.618 5.456
TW 15.432 12.369 12.803 12.582 7.845 8.732 11.627
18.347 10.343 8.294 7.711 2.630 3.061
UD -14.414 -11.368 -12.891
-5.251 -4.345
WR 10.297 4.075 4.280 9.886 3.942 9.585 7.011
9.622 2.886 4.521 7.613 2.843 6.690
LC 1.298 1.298
3.185




RIR 10.739 11.923 18.244 13.635
2.942 2.958 4.219
TFP -26.954 -10.034 -21.989 -9.888 -11.086 -24.389 -17.914 -17.465
-2.911 -2.765 -2.363 -2.902 -2.665 -2.296 -4.005
TTS -20.873 -12.809 -10.927 -10.675 -12.813 -29.548 -16.274
-2.313 -2.446 -1.938 -2.082 -1.903 -3.413
adj. R2 0.781 0.924 0.891 0.968 0.945 0.954 0.842 0.981 0.923 0.977 0.983 0.912 0.832 0.969 0.785
n 3 22 83 23 23 23 22 72 83 43 23 23 43 23 53 4
range 1964-1995 1968-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995 1969-1995 1968-1995 1962-1995 1964-1995 1964-1995 1962-1995 1964-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995
J-Stat.  1.536 2.383 1.134 4.733 2.866 6.117 3.180 1.096 1.523 4.646 0.710 0.312 2.900* 2.270 2.918
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H 0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
log(V) * * * ****** * *
B D ** ** *
R R **** * ** **
H O ******** ** **
TW * * *
U D ** **** ** * *
W R ****** ** ** **
L C * ***** ** *
LFP *
LP *
RIR * * *** *
T F P ** *** ****
TTS * **** ** *
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A7: France
LOG(U)123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 Average
BD -3.328 -3.978 -2.838 -4.052 -3.369 -3.513
-4.149 -3.032 -3.253 -3.942 -4.191
RR 9.721 7.601 8.661
3.294 4.572
HO 10.680 10.301 41.683 10.076 9.502 11.346 15.598
2.835 3.670 4.936 3.558 3.656 4.554
TW -39.784 -20.079 -29.931
-4.872 -4.638
UD 8.108 6.548 8.213 3.871 6.295 6.607
2.728 3.404 3.124 2.269 3.446
WR 5.904 6.307 16.431 6.335 8.744
5.714 6.061 7.191 6.226
LC 1.100 1.250 1.175
3.970 4.874
LP 1.292 1.970 1.631
3.008 5.436
RIR -18.411 -22.109 -21.648 -11.706 -13.618 -12.006 -15.410 -16.415
-5.009 -4.123 -3.723 -3.713 -4.432 -4.198 -4.323
TFP 28.598 39.257 34.644 27.919 36.553 19.909 25.063 25.754 38.681 40.076 24.357 26.128 22.842 32.622 30.172
4.180 5.451 5.239 3.905 3.225 2.281 2.184 3.262 3.940 5.719 3.029 4.253 3.003 3.667
TTS 20.284 21.094 20.689
2.171 2.443
adj. R2 0.681 0.262 0.583 0.572 0.639 0.377 0.401 0.523 0.283 0.696 0.315 0.559 0.718 0.648 0.755 0.509
n 3 33 23 53 23 43 43 43 43 43 43 23 53 23 53 23 5
range 1963-1995 1964-1995 1961-1995 1964-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1964-1995 1961-1995 1964-1995 1961-1995 1964-1995 1961-1995
J-Stat.  2.237 8.742** 0.357 1.817 2.545 0.566 4.467 2.505 2.477 0.120 0.102 0.286 1.373 0.001 1.314 2.336
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H 0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
BD * * * *
R R *** * *** *****
H O ******* *** *
T W * * * ** ****
U D * * ****** ****
WR * ** ** * *
LC * * ***
LFP
LP
RIR * * *
T F P ****************
T T S * ******** * *
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A8: France
LOG(V)123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 Average
LOG(V) -1.060 -1.233 -1.091 -0.944 -1.121 -1.255 -1.251 -1.017 -0.957 -1.242 -1.174 -0.626 -1.081
-6.949 -7.159 -6.398 -4.306 -5.370 -5.553 -4.901 -4.552 -3.997 -8.700 -7.502 -2.248
BD 12.775 15.287 12.268 9.516 12.711 7.957 6.290 10.972
4.354 3.885 4.199 2.388 3.314 2.287 1.933
RR -18.277 -17.269 -17.773
-3.286 -4.002
HO 5.626 4.203 14.914 8.248
2.484 2.344 3.444
TW 8.005 10.678 9.342
2.091 3.565
UD -13.642 -15.399 -14.966 -6.329 -15.041 -5.854 -11.872
-4.094 -10.396 -7.433 -1.971 -6.727 -1.866
LC 0.516 1.265 1.591 1.124
2.091 6.477 3.973
LFP 0.156 0.099 0.091 0.071 0.170 0.133 0.120





TFP 9.894 12.125 11.010
3.353 1.994
TTS
adj. R2 0.958 0.955 0.953 0.954 0.952 0.938 0.932 0.942 0.949 0.949 0.954 0.920
n 3 43 43 43 43 43 43 53 53 53 53 53 5
range 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995
J-Stat.  1.884 1.498 1.258 0.051 2.141 0.012 0.993 2.494 2.550 0.438 1.597 3.189
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
log(V) **** *******
BD * * * ***
R R ***** * **
HO * * * ****
TW * * *
U D ** *** ***
L C **** ***
L F P ********
LP
R I R *** ** **
TFP *
T T S ****** *
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A9: Germany
LOG(U)123456789 1 0 1 1 Average






TW -10.014 -15.582 -12.798
-4.664 -9.317
UD -14.835 -9.919 -11.738 -14.830 -10.305 -13.236 -11.892 -12.393
-4.031 -2.294 -3.475 -4.781 -2.318 -3.239 -2.781
LC -0.985 -1.801 -0.869 -1.218
-3.541 -11.215 -2.058
LP -1.034 -2.217 -1.119 -1.457
-3.645 -12.357 -2.115
RIR -21.192 -34.138 -34.908 -35.435 -36.417 -35.113 -32.867
-2.632 -3.203 -2.976 -3.660 -3.013 -2.689
TFP 17.802 36.742 44.249 32.535 33.249 38.889 33.911
1.971 3.970 5.277 4.706 3.926 5.305
TTS 39.469 28.986 34.228
2.604 2.484
adj. R2 0.777 0.537 0.578 0.520 0.664 0.716 0.611 0.573 0.618 0.632 0.601
n 3 53 53 53 53 43 43 43 53 53 53 5
range 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995
J-Stat.  1.180 1.451 4.796* 1.656 0.952 1.776 7.524 1.674 4.395 1.104 1.323
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
B D ***** ****
R R ** **
H O ** **
TW * * * *
U D ** ***** **
LC * * *
LFP * * * * * *
LP **
R I R ***** *****
T F P ***********
TTS * * * *
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A10: Germany
LOG(V)123456789 1 0 1 1 Average
LOG(V) -0.365 -0.364 -0.331 -0.309 -0.291 -0.240 -0.712 -0.318 -0.286 -0.190 -0.294 -0.336
-4.792 -4.517 -4.761 -5.158 -5.509 -2.841 -3.169 -3.661 -2.128 -0.536 -2.493
BD 1.506 1.994 1.899 1.800
3.199 3.873 4.541
RR 9.157 8.117 2.952 6.742
2.373 5.803 2.570
HO 6.043 18.747 12.395
2.614 12.382
TW 3.366 3.891 11.512 26.874 6.372 10.403
4.469 4.094 3.233 2.077 3.153
UD -5.025 -1.780 -7.339 -11.260 -6.351
-5.543 -3.804 -2.790 -5.281
WR -10.219 -33.984 -22.101
-3.604 -2.321
LC 3.746 2.719 6.840 3.969 4.318
4.835 3.753 2.954 9.094
LFP
LP 3.199 2.121 3.094 6.618 3.758
6.896 2.669 6.281 13.813





adj. R2 0.948 0.884 0.967 0.955 0.966 0.955 0.112 0.958 0.703 0.294 0.887
n 3 52 63 12 63 12 63 43 43 12 62 6
range 1961-1995 1970-1995 1965-1995 1970-1995 1965-1995 1970-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1965-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995
J-Stat.  1.467 0.584 0.285 3.787 3.533 2.989 0.930 1.934 1.967 3.088 2.000
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) ***** *****
B D * **** ***
R R * *** ** * *
HO * * *
TW *****
U D ** ***** *
W R *** **
L C *** * *
LFP
LP * *
R I R ***** * **
T F P * *******
TTS **
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A11: Netherlands
LOG(U)123456789 1 0 Average
BD -2.513 -1.023 -1.768
-2.391 -1.953




TW -4.646 -7.974 -7.534 -6.462 -6.654
-2.023 -2.258 -2.986 -1.777




LC -4.378 -4.171 -4.274
-2.645 -2.880
LP -1.941 -4.415 -3.178
-5.019 -3.178





adj. R2 0.524 0.414 0.286 0.446 0.37 0.476 0.415 0.174 0.154 0.131
n 3 43 53 13 42 63 53 42 62 62 6
range 1962-1995 1961-1995 1965-1995 1962-1995 1970-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995 1970-1995
J-Stat.  1.891 3.572 3.698 2.105 1.037 1.394 3.289 1.482 0.934 3.616
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
BD * * *
RR * ***
HO * *
T W ***** ***
UD * **




R I R * ****** *
T F P **** **
T T S **** ****
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A12: Netherlands
LOG(V)123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 Average
LOG(V) -1.036 -0.788 -0.924 -0.899 -0.644 -0.563 -0.642 -0.586 -0.589 -0.839 -0.707 -0.641 -0.913 -1.050 -0.773
-18.071 -7.304 -11.932 -16.440 -3.970 -6.365 -8.087 -10.009 -3.998 -20.210 -6.021 -5.680 -12.841 -12.421






TW -6.561 -4.433 -5.497
-4.539 -9.054




LFP -0.090 -0.082 -0.194 -0.069 -0.173 -0.142 -0.069 -0.117
-4.628 -5.173 -4.323 -2.657 -5.213 -4.356 -3.330
LP -1.832 -1.832
-4.977
RIR 8.510 4.470 7.093 6.691
3.129 1.617 3.065
TFP 20.020 12.140 13.622 14.929 10.536 19.112 17.769 15.447
5.246 4.980 5.977 8.752 2.455 4.688 5.162
TTS 22.427 9.671 12.474 10.339 13.728
2.121 2.455 1.973 2.889
adj. R2 0.789 0.223 0.958 0.967 0.868 0.883 0.839 0.944 0.901 0.968 0.655 0.901 0.904 0.952
N 3 43 51 91 91 91 91 91 91 91 9 32 19 19 19
Range 1962-1995 1961-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1964-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995 1977-1995
J-Stat.  2.128 2.124 0.531 1.154 0.592 0.672 0.108 3.190 3.154 1.337 2.894 1.678 0.265 0.758
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) **************
B D * ***** *** *
RR *
HO * * **
TW * ***
UD * * * ***
L C * * ***
L F P ******** ***
LP *
R I R ****** * * **
T F P ***** **** *
TTS * ** **
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A13: Sweden
LOG(U)123456789 1 0 Average
BD -5.843 -5.843
-2.320












RIR -10.071 -9.393 -8.465 -8.750 -10.245 -9.435 -9.505 -9.409
-2.282 -2.193 -1.858 -2.008 -3.012 -3.118 -3.066
TFP 26.319 25.107 20.450 49.690 30.391
2.285 2.206 2.043 9.685
TTS
adj. R2 0.376 0.375 0.393 0.424 -0.018 0.062 0.336 0.819 0.415 0.433
N 3 43 43 43 43 53 43 41 93 23 5
Range 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1977-1995 1964-1995 1961-1995
J-Stat.  3.469 3.990 5.093 5.377 0.030 0.181 2.239 1.164 3.461 7.150**
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
BD * * **
R R ******
HO * * *
TW ***




R I R **** *
T F P **********
T T S **** **
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
LOG(V)
Table A14: Sweden123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 Average
LOG(V) -1.041 -0.738 -0.444 -0.554 -0.944 -0.968 -0.645 -1.438 -0.932 -0.552 -0.341 -0.713 -0.522 -2.925 -1.364 -0.470 -0.563 -0.947 -0.356 -0.866
-3.602 -3.532 -2.396 -2.481 -3.941 -3.683 -4.500 -3.918 -3.860 -2.208 -2.703 -2.313 -2.996 -3.568 -3.254 -3.435 -3.148 -3.964 -2.825
BD 1.389 1.215 1.845 2.016 1.765 1.179 1.811 1.603
4.565 2.827 3.538 8.353 2.941 4.038 5.375
RR -3.680 -6.485 -3.163 -4.267 -5.894 -2.310 -2.761 -3.739 -4.037
-3.628 -8.244 -3.826 -5.163 -6.937 -2.601 -3.337 -3.418
HO 2.154 6.211 6.946 4.122 3.792 4.645
2.926 8.836 8.673 5.981 4.695
TW 7.180 9.982 6.734 9.126 7.083 9.386 6.982 7.948 9.092 6.554 7.484 7.959
7.469 11.473 5.174 11.370 6.801 5.962 4.983 5.473 6.455 4.442 7.021
UD 4.478 4.747 5.831 3.778 9.558 3.469 4.549 4.777 5.148
9.085 8.222 7.956 5.747 6.279 2.783 9.111 8.911
LC 2.830 2.150 0.849 1.912 1.935
21.609 13.201 2.392 7.025
LFP 0.323 0.237 0.332 0.177 0.267
6.662 2.285 3.599 3.435
LP 3.086 2.446 1.038 1.912 2.121
21.925 17.063 2.067 8.595
RIR 6.293 7.040 6.004 18.136 9.032 5.023 5.998 8.218
4.046 4.021 2.876 4.228 2.399 2.953 3.280
TFP 12.412 9.992 9.405 17.420 13.022 45.561 21.686 10.514 17.501
2.579 2.314 2.581 1.906 3.199 2.756 4.521 2.521
TTS 10.036 11.459 10.747
2.605 2.956
adj. R2 0.945 0.913 0.963 0.952 0.95 0.943 0.957 0.904 0.948 0.906 0.963 0.722 0.806 0.54 0.898 0.974 0.966 0.952 0.961
n 3 53 43 43 43 43 53 53 43 53 43 53 43 43 43 53 53 53 43 5
range 1961-1995 1961-1994 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1994 1961-1994 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995
J-Stat.  1.134 0.883 2.213 2.763 1.451 2.618 0.386 0.957 1.273 2.111 2.495 2.048 0.656 5.560 3.180 1.472 1.244 1.795 1.748
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) * * * *********** *
B D *** * ***** *** *
R R **** * *** ***** *
HO * * *** *
T W ** **** ** ********
U D ** ** ****
L C *** * **
L F P ****** *** * ** *
LP **
R I R ******* ** ***
T F P ***** *************
TTS * * * * *
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A15: UK
LOG(U)123456789 1 0 Average
BD -0.858 -0.911 -0.899 -0.890
-1.707 -2.594 -1.757




TW -2.308 -2.766 -2.537
-2.152 -3.357
UD -1.792 -2.140 -1.721 -1.742 -1.849
-1.953 -2.719 -2.272 -1.850
LC -0.460 -0.506 -0.483
-2.777 -2.962
LP -0.536 -0.505 -0.520
-2.935 -3.403
RIR -3.092 -2.986 -3.039
-2.648 -1.917
TFP 9.821 16.407 10.151 15.514 9.503 17.909 12.597 9.082 12.663 15.682 12.933
3.575 4.813 4.123 7.101 3.300 5.584 3.822 3.227 3.110 7.463
TTS
adj. R2 0.486 0.360 0.495 0.423 0.498 0.374 0.418 0.434 0.352 0.426
n 3 43 43 53 43 53 43 43 43 43 4
range 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995
J-Stat.  0.921 4.548 2.938 7.010* 0.790 1.426 2.351 6.398 6.549* 7.284*
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
B D *** * ***
R R * *******
H O *** *
T W ** *** *
UD * *
LC * * ***
L F P **********
LP * *
RIR * * * *
TFP * * * *
T T S * * *****
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A16: UK
LOG(V)123456789 1 0 1 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 6 1 7 1 8 1 9 Average
LOG(V) -0.348 -0.860 -0.064 -0.660 -1.000 -0.926 0.260 -0.780 -1.003 0.045 -1.048 -0.999 -1.031 -0.211 0.600 -0.985 0.130 -1.044 0.431 -0.500
-2.239 -6.089 -0.176 -3.020 -10.943 -10.984 0.722 -6.614 -7.362 0.127 -12.758 -14.353 -4.947 -1.204 1.704 -7.295 0.354 -5.633 1.857
BD -6.250 -5.948 -5.412 -2.022 -5.736 -1.571 -4.490
-2.644 -2.290 -2.588 -2.244 -2.906 -2.051
RR 3.993 3.473 3.733
10.577 3.812
HO 12.922 13.347 17.476 15.846 16.725 14.961 15.969 16.707 14.780 15.307 15.689 15.430
6.018 5.451 10.423 10.859 15.038 6.942 9.449 14.096 5.909 6.914 6.735
TW 1.555 3.937 2.287 1.625 2.351
3.757 3.398 3.753 2.182
UD -2.592 -1.057 -1.824
-5.384 -2.079
WR -0.932 -1.194 -2.072 -1.637 -0.949 -1.357
-1.961 -6.878 -2.761 -6.610 -2.406
LC 0.429 0.943 0.850 0.741
3.714 3.327 3.216
LFP 0.022 0.024 0.023
5.392 3.090
LP 0.597 1.309 1.158 1.021
3.560 3.026 3.335
RIR 2.762 2.129 2.797 3.047 2.864 2.720
2.274 2.679 2.409 2.126 2.369
TFP -8.525 -18.752 -34.799 -27.909 -13.444 -28.040 -30.178 -29.522 -23.896
-3.906 -2.143 -4.664 -3.474 -2.587 -5.397 -3.636 -4.834
TTS -19.662 -11.683 -37.475 -22.940
-2.663 -2.669 -2.396
adj. R2 0.803 0.902 0.338 0.759 0.909 0.951 0.145 0.928 0.895 0.201 0.894 0.939 0.796 0.717 0.435 0.892 0.076 0.805 0.182
n 34 35 34 34 34 35 34 34 35 34 35 35 35 35 35 35 34 35 35
range 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995 1962-1995 1961-1995 1961-1995
J-Stat.  9.835 1.914 3.284 0.539 2.579 0.727 2.834 2.444 1.560 5.548 0.337 8.951 4.338 3.122 5.291 1.005 4.647 4.660 3.066
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
LOG(V) ******************
B D * *** *** *
R R * * ** ** *
H O ******************
T W **** ** *** * *
U D *** * ** ** * **
WR * * * *
L C **** ***** ** *
LFP * **** * * *
LP ***
RIR * * * * * * * * *
T F P * * *** ****** *
T T S * *** ** * *
All instruments are laged by one year
Table A17: USA
LOG(U)
Instruments123456789 1 0 Average
BD 6.733 6.733
4.032
RR 3.472 2.748 4.760 3.660
2.387 3.567 6.138
HO 8.289 11.569 8.006 9.377 9.310
2.162 7.755 4.497 2.386
TW 3.853 3.853
3.374
UD -1.255 -1.076 -1.166
-1.862 -2.952
WR 2.420 2.936 2.040 2.466
2.677 2.599 4.360
LC 0.895 1.234 1.064
1.937 4.066
LP 1.388 2.208 1.798
1.878 3.394
RIR -8.003 -5.523 -3.826 -2.985 -5.854 -5.238
-2.833 -2.350 -2.035 -2.877 -2.275
TFP 21.879 23.237 31.412 22.169 21.097 18.979 23.992 10.184 9.798 25.735 20.848
3.556 3.884 3.824 5.069 7.999 8.475 3.707 3.798 3.144 8.705
TTS 27.257 27.065 26.251 28.456 27.257
4.586 3.654 2.751 2.764
adj. R2 0.078 0.207 -0.515 0.475 0.516 0.660 0.145 0.537 0.368 0.460
n 3 53 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 4
range 1961-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995 1962-1995
J-Stat.  2.393 0.237 1.724 2.895 1.229 0.887 0.898 2.807 1.883 0.227
Numbers under the coefficients are HAC t-Statistics. J-Statistic: H0 = exogenous instruments, *(**) H0 is rejected at the 10% (5%) level.
BD * ****
R R **** **
HO ** *
T W ** ******
U D ** ****
W R * * ***




T F P **** ****
T T S *********
All instruments are laged by one year
Instruments
Table A18: USA
LOG(V)Table B1: Austria 
    BD RR HO TW UD LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.466 0.268 0.466 0.550 0.525 5.260  67.297  5.956 0.035 0.000 -0.005 
Median  0.739 0.310 0.463 0.567 0.521 5.500  66.300  6.088 0.039 -0.001  -0.006 
Maximum  0.752 0.376 0.550 0.602 0.600 5.644  72.100  6.294 0.055 0.034 0.024 
Minimum  0.000 0.113 0.380 0.452 0.407 4.435  63.800  5.287 0.001 -0.028  -0.036 
Std.  Dev.  0.359 0.087 0.061 0.045 0.053 0.393 2.725 0.312 0.014 0.017 0.011 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 35 34 36 31 36 35 
 
 
Table B2: Canada 
    BD RR HO TW UD WR LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.259 0.519 0.618 0.415 0.334 0.449 3.209  71.160  3.766 0.040 0.000 -0.003 
Median  0.242 0.578 0.614 0.419 0.357 0.440 3.217  73.000  3.802 0.037 0.003 -0.003 
Maximum  0.359 0.653 0.660 0.516 0.386 0.530 3.391  78.600  3.960 0.096 0.024 0.012 
Minimum  0.178 0.351 0.600 0.299 0.259 0.390 2.916  63.275  3.447 -0.046  -0.038  -0.018 
Std.  Dev.  0.059 0.094 0.014 0.059 0.041 0.045 0.125 5.497 0.148 0.030 0.014 0.008 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 30 43 36 36 36 35 
 
 
Table B3: Denmark 
    BD RR HO TW UD LC LFP LP RIR  TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.686 0.509 0.495 0.515 0.702 4.878  79.243  5.517 0.056 0.000 -0.004 
Median  0.639 0.598 0.510 0.542 0.740 4.998  80.100  5.564 0.057 -0.001  -0.005 
Maximum  1.016 0.718 0.520 0.647 0.808 5.199  84.100  5.808 0.121 0.027 0.056 
Minimum  0.521 0.235 0.430 0.289 0.599 4.310  71.200  5.118 0.004 -0.028  -0.046 
Std.  Dev.  0.124 0.167 0.026 0.102 0.080 0.257 3.220 0.198 0.030 0.016 0.018 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 37 36 36 36 35 Table B4: France 
    BD RR HO TW UD WR LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.320 0.555 0.487 0.611 0.172 0.557 4.705  67.949  5.355 0.034 0.000 -0.002 
Median  0.270 0.575 0.495 0.608 0.191 0.580 4.834  68.100  5.425 0.035 -0.001  -0.003 
Maximum  0.508 0.634 0.540 0.680 0.222 0.630 5.081  69.700  5.726 0.073 0.025 0.057 
Minimum  0.169 0.440 0.410 0.538 0.099 0.430 4.009  66.500  4.744 -0.023  -0.017  -0.037 
Std.  Dev.  0.123 0.049 0.045 0.046 0.044 0.059 0.333 0.938 0.290 0.025 0.011 0.014 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 41 33 35 36 36 36 35 
 
 
Table B5: Germany 
    BD RR HO TW UD LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.596 0.396 0.366 0.478 0.332 3.534  69.656  4.154 0.038 0.000 -0.003 
Median  0.603 0.391 0.380 0.485 0.332 3.686  69.400  4.226 0.039 0.000 -0.004 
Maximum  0.626 0.427 0.400 0.541 0.355 3.876  72.300  4.509 0.062 0.025 0.033 
Minimum  0.561 0.363 0.290 0.416 0.274 2.821  66.400  3.596 0.007 -0.026  -0.038 
Std.  Dev.  0.023 0.020 0.031 0.037 0.018 0.328 1.610 0.270 0.013 0.013 0.013 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 36 43 36 36 36 35 
 
 
Table B6: Netherlands 
    BD RR HO TW UD WR LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.469 0.630 0.387 0.521 0.333 0.569 3.780  64.044  4.253 0.030 0.000 -0.008 
Median  0.503 0.650 0.403 0.545 0.362 0.580 3.788  61.750  4.388 0.030 0.000 -0.012 
Maximum  0.695 0.700 0.440 0.572 0.417 0.660 3.928  76.300  4.418 0.071 0.038 0.097 
Minimum  0.000 0.283 0.290 0.433 0.240 0.470 3.509  56.600  3.757 -0.032  -0.036  -0.087 
Std.  Dev.  0.200 0.114 0.051 0.050 0.062 0.060 0.095 6.871 0.214 0.029 0.019 0.029 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 37 27 32 36 36 36 35 Table B7: Sweden 
    BD RR HO TW UD LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.03 0.48 0.39 0.66 0.75 5.04  79.94  5.53 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Median  0.05 0.62 0.40 0.73 0.79 5.09  80.60  5.56 0.03 0.00 0.00 
Maximum  0.05 0.74 0.42 0.83 0.91 5.26  83.00  5.84 0.09 0.02 0.07 
Minimum  0.00 0.10 0.35 0.37 0.63 4.58  76.80  5.11 -0.05  -0.02  -0.04 
Std.  Dev.  0.02 0.26 0.03 0.14 0.09 0.18 2.02 0.19 0.03 0.01 0.02 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 33 27 36 36 36 35 
 
 
Table B8: UK 
    BD RR HO TW UD LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.675 0.292 0.554 0.449 0.483 2.212  73.863  2.780 0.027 0.000 -0.002 
Median  0.681 0.286 0.543 0.464 0.484 2.234  73.700  2.802 0.033 0.001 -0.006 
Maximum  0.891 0.380 0.680 0.529 0.575 2.514  76.900  3.102 0.069 0.039 0.070 
Minimum  0.514 0.215 0.420 0.332 0.367 1.780  72.000  2.373 -0.102  -0.029  -0.029 
Std.  Dev.  0.113 0.057 0.087 0.056 0.056 0.226 1.411 0.220 0.033 0.016 0.018 
Observations  36 36 36 36 36 35 41 36 36 36 35 
 
 
Table B9: USA 
    BD RR HO TW UD WR LC LFP LP RIR TFP  TTS 
Mean  0.166 0.261 0.654  21.256  0.224 0.432 3.180  74.184  3.727 0.031 0.000 0.000 
Median  0.166 0.245 0.650  22.300  0.242 0.430 3.209  74.800  3.734 0.026 0.001 -0.001 
Maximum  0.227 0.357 0.680  30.300  0.288 0.550 3.379  79.600  3.883 0.086 0.024 0.024 
Minimum  0.000 0.206 0.640  13.000  0.149 0.340 2.842  67.100  3.508 -0.013  -0.023  -0.009 
Std.  Dev.  0.041 0.041 0.013 5.631 0.046 0.059 0.142 4.435 0.093 0.024 0.012 0.006 
Observations  36 36 36 41 36 41 36 43 36 36 36 35 
 